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The States, Congress, or the Courts: Who Will
Be First To Reform ERISA Remedies?
Curtis D. Rooney*
INTRODUCTION
Across the nation, state legislatures, Congress, and the courts
have begun to consider the questions surrounding the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act's ("ERISA") remedies and
preemption provisions.1 To date, the courts have sent mixed sig-
nals to patients who want to sue managed care organizations
("MCOs")2 for state law claims when beneficiaries receive their
health care through an employee benefit plan governed by ER-
ISA. 3 In many jurisdictions MCOs have escaped state tort lia-
* Curtis D. Rooney is with the law firm of Arent Fox Kinter Plotkin & Kahn,
practicing in the Health Law Group. Most recently, Mr. Rooney was Washington
Counsel to the American Medical Association. He holds a Bachelor of Arts from
George Washington University and received his Juris Doctor from Catholic Univer-
sity. Mr. Rooney would like to thank the American Medical Association for provid-
ing the opportunity to write this Article as well as those others who have helped to
make it possible.
1. See generally Patient Access to Responsible Care Act, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong.
(1997), S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. Charles Norwood (R-Ga.) and
Sen. Alphonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.)); see also Employee Health Insurance Accounta-
bility Act of 1997, S. 1136, 105th Cong. § 1 (1997) (sponsored by Sen. Richard Durbin
(D-Ill.)); Managed Care Plan Accountability Act of 1997, H.R. 1749, 105th Cong.
(1997) (sponsored by Rep. Pete Stark (D-Cal.)); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F. 3d 637 (7th
Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Okla. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153 (10th Cir. 1995); Dukes v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 351 (3d Cir. 1995); Health Care Liability Act, TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.,§ 88 (West 1998).
2. Managed care organization ("MCO") refers to an entity that provides a variety
of health insurance products, including health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"),
preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), and point-of-service ("POS") plans.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1144 (1997). ERISA applies to both employee pension and welfare benefit
plans, including health benefit plans. In general, ERISA applies to employee benefit
plans that are not offered by governments or churches, and are not established mainly
to comply with worker's compensation, unemployment compensation, or disability
insurance laws. See id. Under ERISA, an employee benefit plan is any entity that
meets the following definition:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program which is heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by any employee organization, or by both, to
the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained
for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
1
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bility by successfully asserting that ERISA preempts such
actions when they "relate to" an employee benefit plan.4 To
support these holdings, some courts have cited the corporate
practice of medicine bar that exists in many states.
By characterizing the dispute as a "benefits claim" rather than
a determination of "medical necessity,"'6 defendants have suc-
cessfully used ERISA's preemption provisions as a shield to
avoid state law remedies such as extracontractual, compensa-
tory, and punitive or exemplary damages. 7 In addition, ER-
ISA's preemption provisions have also led to the growth of self-
insured plans (and the subsequent decline in the use of insured
plans). Employers have found it more affordable to self-insure
because under ERISA, states may regulate only the terms of the
insurance products purchased by employers; they may not regu-
late the contents or administration of self-insured plans.8
Although the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Travelers
v. Cuomo9 may indicate a new direction in ERISA preemption
jurisprudence, jurists continue to labor over providing adequate
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disa-
bility, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services, or (B) any benefit described in [section 302(c) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947]( other than pensions on retirement or death,
and insurance to provide such pensions) . . . . (5) The term "employer"
means any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest
of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; and includes a
group or association of employers acting for an employer in such capacity.
Id. § 1002 (1), (5).
4. See ADVOCACY RESOURCE CENTER, AM. MED. ASS'N, TRENDS IN MANAGED
CARE LIABILITY: A CHANGING LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE (1997).
5. See id. For a discussion of corporate practice of medicine statutes, see NA-
TIONAL HEALTH LAW. Ass'N & AM. ACAD. OF HEALTHCARE ATr'Ys, PATIENT CARE
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE DOCTRINE AND RELATED LAWS AND REGULATIONS (1997).
6. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F. 2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that state malpractice and wrongful death claims against an HMO
were preempted under ERISA). In that case, the alleged wrongful death and mal-
practice resulted from the HMO's denial of precertification of hospital admission de-
spite the recommendation of the treating physician. See id. See also Edward B.
Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The Need for a
New Legal Structure, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 42-43 (1996).
7. See Gabriel J. Minc, ERISA Preemption of Medical Negligence Claims Against
Managed Care Providers: The Search for an Effective Theory and an Appropriate
Remedy, 29 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 97, 100-01 (1996).
8. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 958 (1985).
9. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom.
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995).
[Vol. 7
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remedies under the law. Exacerbating the confusion is the rapid
merger of health care delivery and finance systems, the wide-
spread use of utilization review, the growth of managed care,
and the subsequent public backlash against it.' °
Given this environment, the time has come for both managed
care reform and ERISA reform.1 Although ERISA has been
amended numerous times since its inception,'2 attempts to
change the exclusive damages and preemption provisions have
met with considerable controversy.' 3 Not since the death of the
Clinton health care plan has the time been so ripe for reform.
While recent developments suggest that some type of change
may be imminent, the question remains: Who will be the first to
reform ERISA's remedies provisions, the states, Congress, or
the courts?
The legal and policy issues surrounding ERISA and ERISA
preemption have been referred to as a veritable "Sargasso sea of
obfuscation."' 4 This Article will attempt to break through the
morass and provide a clearer definition of ERISA-related
problems and concerns. Parts I and II will provide a brief back-
ground describing the historical significance of the statute and
an explanation of the effect of ERISA on managed care. Part
10. See Amy Goldstein, Managed Care Is Trusted Less, Survey Shows, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 1997, at A17 (reporting on survey sponsored by Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation and Harvard University).
11. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D. Mass. 1997).
12. For example, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("CO-
BRA") amended ERISA to provide for the continuation of benefit coverage for spec-
ified periods for employees no longer employed. In addition, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") amended ERISA and was it-
self amended shortly after its enactment to include new federal requirements relating
to minimum hospital maternity stays. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
HIPAA also amended provisions relating to the parity of mental health benefits. See
Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874 (1996).
13. For an example of a failed attempt at Congressional ERISA reform, see S.
794, 102d Cong. §§ 1 (1991), introduced by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
in April of 1991. The bill was designed, in part, to amend ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) to
save from preemption any statute or common law that provides a remedy against
insurance companies regarding such companies' practices in administering employee
benefit plans or processing insurance claims. See 137 CONG. REC. 4246 (1991) (state-
ment of Sen. Metzenbaum). Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal) introduced the
companion bill in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 1602, 102d Cong. § 2
(1992); see also H.R. 6137, 102d Cong. (1992), which would have given plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries a "vested" right to existing benefit levels for the treatment of
their existing illness.
14. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom.
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995).
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III will emphasize ERISA's sweeping preemption provisions,
and Part IV will offer a general overview of the major preemp-
tion cases. Part V will provide specific examples of ERISA pre-
emption provisions as they relate to medical malpractice claims.
Next, Part VI will delineate the various state and federal ERISA
reform proposals. Finally, Part VII will conclude by offering a
number of alternatives to restore some much needed fairness to
patients under ERISA.
I. BACKGROUND
The passage of ERISA in 1974 marked the culmination of ap-
proximately a decade of investigations into abuses in the na-
tion's pension system.15 As a result of the wage and price
controls imposed during World War II, employee benefit plans
became increasingly popular in the 1940s.16 Employers utilized
employee benefit plans as a supplement to wages and as a
means to attract and keep a skilled workforce. In the 1960s, un-
favorable media reports of employees unfairly losing their pen-
sion benefits earned the attention of John F. Kennedy early in
his presidency.1 7 At the time, President Kennedy recognized
that there was not sufficient regulation of these plans and ap-
pointed the Commission on Corporate Pension Funds to study
the issues and to make recommendations. 18 The report and rec-
ommendations of that commission created an appreciable
amount of congressional interest in federal legislation.19
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, it created an almost
unprecedented preemption provision. In general, ERISA's pre-
emption provisions supersede all state laws that "relate to" em-
ployee benefit plans.2 0 In addition, Congress created a number
of requirements aimed at protecting employee pension benefits
from mismanagement, fraud and abuse, and employer bankrupt-
cies under ERISA. The law contains reporting21 and disclosure
15. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1997) (stating Congress's intent in passing
ERISA).
16. See John N. Erleborn, Foreword to G. LAWRENCE ATKINS & KRISTIN .BASS,
ERISA PREEMPTION: THE KEY TO MARKET INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE (1995).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1997).
21. But see Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
This Act modifies ERISA such that sponsors of employee benefit plans are no longer
required to file summary plan descriptions and summary material modifications with
the Department of Labor. See id. The new law does require, however, that such
[Vol. 7
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criteria, fiduciary requirements, 22 and a civil enforcement
scheme 23 that limits employer liability. Congress also sought to
encourage the formation of employer plans through the use of
incentives in the Internal Revenue Code.24 During the debate
over ERISA, sponsors of employee benefit plans, including
health and welfare plans and organized labor, expressed concern
that "a patchwork of regulation and remedies would discourage
the adoption and maintenance of such plans. '25
As the legislative history of ERISA shows, both the Senate
and House bills originally contained preemption clauses. In
fact, the conference committee, the committee responsible for
resolving the differences between the two bills, included a pre-
emption clause that was even broader than either of the two
original measures. Representative John Dent (D-Pa.), one of
the original authors of ERISA, stated:
I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achieve-
ment of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority
[of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit
plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the pro-
tection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of con-
flicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.26
In support of this view, the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he
basic thrust of the preemption clause. . . was to avoid multiplic-
ity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform ad-
ministration of employee benefit plans. '27 Included in this
scheme are ERISA's comprehensive civil enforcement provi-
sions. The civil enforcement provisions were created to allow a
participant or beneficiary enrolled in an employer plan to seek
recovery for denied benefits. However, the Supreme Court has
documents be filed upon the request of the Department within 30 days of the origina-
tion of the request. See id.
22. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994) (stating ERISA reporting and dis-
closure rules); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (stating ERISA fiduciary rules).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
24. See I.R.C. § 105(h) (1997). The exclusion of employer contributions to self-
insured health plans and plan benefits from the taxable income of highly compensated
participants is dependent upon the plan meeting the nondiscrimination requirements
of IRC § 105(h). See id. These provisions require that self-insured plans not discrimi-
nate in favor of highly compensated employees in either plan eligibility or provision
of benefits. See id. To the extent that excess reimbursement is provided to highly
compensated employees, the amount of the excess becomes taxable to the employee.
See id.
25. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
26. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974).
27. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 718 (2d Cir. 1994).
19981
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held that any state law claims to recover from an ERISA plan
are preempted under section 502(a)(1)(B), which provides the
exclusive remedies available under ERISA.28 The Supreme
Court has sought to shed light on the question of ERISA pre-
emption in well over a dozen cases, and Justice Antonin Scalia
in his concurring opinion in Dillingham Construction29 seems to
indicate where the Court has been and where it may be going on
this important issue. In that opinion Scalia writes:
I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law
if we simply acknowledged that our first take on this statute
was wrong; that the "relate to" clause of the pre-emption pro-
vision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but
rather to identify the field in which ordinary field pre-emption
applies .... Our new approach to ERISA pre-emption is set
forth in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Harris Trust and
Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993): .... I think it accurately
describes our current ERISA jurisprudence to say that we ap-
ply ordinary field pre-emption, and, of course, ordinary con-
flict pre-emption.3"
It is doubtful, however, that the Supreme Court or the fram-
ers of ERISA could have foreseen in 1974 the tremendous
growth of managed care and the use of self-insurance by em-
ployers in the 1990s. The Department of Labor estimates that
about 125 million Americans are provided health insurance ben-
efits through an ERISA plan.31 While many of these plans are
fully insured, a report by the General Accounting Office
("GAO") estimated that 44 million Americans are in self-in-
sured health plans that cannot be regulated by the states.32 The
GAO also reported that 140 million individuals (54% of the
U.S. population) obtained coverage through the employment-
28. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985). In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court held that even if the participant can prove that the delay or
denial constituted a breach of fiduciary responsibility, ERISA only allows for the re-
covery of "appropriate equitable relief," a term construed not to include any sort of
damages or restitution for losses. See id.
29. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 117 S.Ct. 832, 843 (1997).
30. Id.
31. Pension Welfare Benefit Admin.,U.S. Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet (August
1997).
32. See U. S. GEN. Accr. OFF., EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES,
TRENDS AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 9 (1995 [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
Note, however, that this number may be declining. See Beth C. Fuchs, Managed
Health Care: Federal and State Regulation, CONG. RES. SERVICE, (October 8, 1997).
[Vol. 7
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based system.33 A more recent study suggests that 85% of those
in the employment-based system are enrolled in some form of
managed care.34 So much variation in the health care system
raises increasing concerns regarding the appropriate level of
consumer protection under federal and state laws that govern
private-sector employee health coverage.
II. WHAT IS "MANAGED CARE. '
"Managed care" is a term that generally means "a system of
payment or delivery arrangement where the health plan at-
tempts to control or coordinate use of health services by its en-
rolled member in order to control spending and promote
health. ' 36 While there is no single definition of managed care,
this description suggests a continuum of care in which patients
are afforded a varying degree of choice of physicians and prov-
iders. The definition also suggests a system that ranges from
more or less financial responsibility required of patients, with
another scale of financial risk for providers, plan sponsors, and
insurers of health care services.
In the past, the only type of arrangement that offered man-
aged care was a health maintenance organization ("HMO"). 37
Now, MCOs come in many different shapes and forms. For ex-
ample, a preferred provider organization ("PPO") may be lik-
ened to a health care broker that provides discounted health
services directly or through a third-party payor. A provider-
sponsored organization ("PSO") is another form of managed
33. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 10. The GAO study found that 54% of
the population is covered by the employment-based system, and has coverage through
an ERISA-governed plan. See id. While GAO estimated that 44% of the U.S. popu-
lation (114 million individuals) was covered by an ERISA plan, another 10% in the
employment-based system was exempt from ERISA (e.g., government and certain
not-for-profit organization plans). See id. ERISA also governs some multiple-em-
ployer welfare arrangements ("MEWAs"). See id. Other members of the population
maintain coverage through Medicare (12%), Medicaid (9%), other government pro-
grams such as the Veterans Administration system and CHAMPUS (2%), or individ-
ually purchased coverage (8%). See id.
34. See 12th Annual Mercer/Foster Higgins National Survey of Employer-Spon-
sored Health Plans, News Release (Jan. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Mercer/Foster Higgins
Survey]; see ALSO Improving Health Care Quality in an Industry in Transition, Report
of the President's Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the
Health Care Industry, draft chapter.
35. Patricia Butler & Karl Polzer, Private-Sector Health Coverage: Variation in
Consumer Protections under ERISA and State Law, in Nat'l Health Pol'y Forum 6
(1996).
36. Fuchs, supra note 32.
37. See id.
1998]
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care that, like the PPO, offers patients a greater degree of
choice.
In addition, many HMO products now offer patients a point-
of-service ("POS") option that gives them the ability to seek
medical care from providers outside of the network more freely.
In exchange for this added choice, patients are charged an addi-
tional premium. POS options generally require patients to have
a primary care "gatekeeper" physician who monitors referrals
and is paid on a capitated basis. While there are a number of
organizational types of HMOs, such arrangements traditionally
have been associated with entities that provide services through
a network. In general, enrollees in managed care plans are
given financial incentives to use services within the plan's pro-
vider network, but still receive some coverage even if they ob-
tain care from outside providers. However, enrollees who seek
services outside the network will be forced to pay higher copay-
ments and deductibles.
On the provider side, MCOs often provide physicians with fi-
nancial incentives, such as capitation and withhold arrange-
ments, which may effectively reward physicians for limiting
referrals to specialists and limiting the number of tests and pro-
cedures provided to patients. In general, under the fee-for-ser-
vice system, physicians and health care providers operated with
an incentive to order more tests and offer more procedures than
may have been necessary. In contrast, the incentives under
managed care are just the opposite. One of the main criticisms
of managed care is that patients may be harmed or receive inad-
equate care in a system that rewards the limitation or underuse
of health care services. 38
In recent history, employers have fled fee-for-service insur-
ance in favor of managed care products because of the promise
of reduced costs associated with managed care. Employers were
especially concerned about the rising cost of health care exper-
ienced nationally in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today, man-
aged care has become the dominant form of health care delivery
in the country.39 The form of MCOs, of course, varies. Because
it is not always clear what form of managed care is being de-
38. See Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958
F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (E.D. Va. 1997); see also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997) (stating that HMO had a duty to disclose its
financial incentive structure).
39. See Mercer/Foster Higgins Survey, supra note 34.
[Vol. 7
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scribed, efforts have been made to clarify this situation. For ex-
ample, one proposed taxonomy 4° categorizes health insurance
products in health plans by whether their sponsor assumes fi-
nancial risk, whether an intermediary assumes financial risk,
whether the associated physicians assume financial risk, whether
consumers are restricted in the providers they may select,
whether significant utilization controls are placed on providers'
practices, and whether plans are obligated to arrange for care
provision, versus paying for any care received. 41
While such efforts to accurately characterize managed care
may be helpful, in general they have not made deciphering the
rights and responsibilities of patients, providers, and plans any
more meaningful for courts tasked with deciding remedies is-
sues. This has been especially true when the managed care plan
is offered by an employer governed by ERISA that preempts
state laws. When an employee benefit plan contracts with an
MCO to provide health care services, the MCO acts in the ca-
pacity of the plan's administrator and therefore is often a fiduci-
ary under ERISA.42 As such, the MCO is allowed to utilize the
full force and power of ERISA's preemption provisions.4 3
MCOs have been squarely criticized for hiding behind ERISA
as a shield,"" and the Department of Labor has submitted ami-
cus curiae briefs in support of plan participants and
beneficiaries. 5
40. See Subcomm. on Roles and Resp. of Pub./Private Purchasers and Quality
Oversight Org. of the Comm'n on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health
Care Industry, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Marc I. Machiz, Assoc. Solicitor for
Plan Benefits Security). "In its amicus briefs, the Department has argued, and the
courts have largely agreed, that malpractice claims are not preempted under the doc-
trine of complete preemption discussed in the Pilot Life case because such claims
arise from the provision of health care, not from denial of a benefit." Id.
41. Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory deLissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Tax-
onomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
75, 82-85 (1993).
42. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1998).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(3)(16)(A)(i). Under section 3(16)(A)(i) of ERISA, a
plan administrator constitutes a fiduciary (as defined in section 3(21)(A)). The MCO
is considered a fiduciary because it may exercise discretionary authority and control
over the ERISA plan's assets, and exercises discretionary authority and responsibility
in the administration of the plan. See id.
44. See THE CAMPAIGN FOR HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUE PAPER/ME-
DIA BACKGROUNDER, Fall 1997.
45. See supra note 40.
19981
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III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION, ERISA PREEMPTION AND
REMEDIES
The tangle of terminology ensnarling the term "ERISA pre-
emption" has engendered a considerable amount of litigation.
A thorough comprehension of the issue of remedies requires not
only a familiarity with the specific remedies available under ER-
ISA, but also a general understanding of the dimensions of ER-
ISA's preemption of state laws. In general, ERISA preemption
means that any state law that "relates to" an employee benefit
plan is preempted.4 6 A more specific discussion of ERISA's
preemption and its remedies provisions is offered below.
A. Section 514 Preemption
Under section 514(a), ERISA supersedes "any and all state
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan" as defined under Title 1 of ERISA. 47 This
general rule contains the following exceptions:
" Section 514 (b)(2)(A), known as the "savings clause," states
that "any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking
or securities ' 48 is not preempted.
" Section 514(b)(B) known as the "deemer clause" states that
"neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust estab-
lished under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer... or to be engaged in the business
of insurance for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies. '49
As the Supreme Court has stated:
If a state law "relate[s] to . . .employee benefit plans," it is
pre-empted. § 514(a). The savings clause excepts from the
pre-emption clause laws that "regulat[e] insurance."
§ 514(b)(2)(A). The deemer clause makes clear that a state
law that "purport[s] to regulate insurance" cannot deem an
employee benefit plan to be an insurance company.
§ 514(b)(2)(B). 50
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a).
47. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
48. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1998). State law, defined in section 514(c)(1) of ERISA,
"includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect
of law." Id.
49. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
50. Pilot Life Ins. Co. V. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987).
[Vol. 7
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The question whether a certain state action is preempted by fed-
eral law is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone.5 1
B. Section 502 (a)(1) (B) Remedies
Regarding remedies, a plaintiff may bring suit under ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits under the terms of an
ERISA plan or to enforce or clarify the plaintiff's rights under
an ERISA plan. This section provides a comprehensive civil
enforcement scheme and generally preempts state law.53 Under
section 502(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff may bring suit in either state or
federal court,54 yet this provision is the exclusive remedy for
civil claims under ERISA As noted above, recovery is limited
to either the cost of the benefit denied, or a declaratory judg-
ment or injunction directing the ERISA plan to provide benefits
to the plaintiff.56 As discussed below, a number of courts have
sought to circumvent the preemptive effect of this provision of
ERISA, with mixed results.
It is interesting to note that Congress expected that the courts
would establish a federal common law to assist in the enforce-
ment of ERISA. Congress stated that "[i]t is also intended that
a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under
the private welfare and pension plans. ' 57 Unfortunately, the
courts have, by and large, hesitated to follow this mandate.
51. See id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
53. See Id. § 1132(a) Section 502(a) permits suits (i) by participants and benefi-
ciaries of benefits under a plan, (ii) by the Secretary of Labor, a participant, benefici-
ary, or fiduciary for breach of any fiduciary duty, and (iii) by a participant, beneficiary
or fiduciary to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress a violation of ER-
ISA or to enforce the terms of the plan. See id.
54. See id. § 1132(e)(1).
55. See id. §1132(a)(1)(B). (1998). In general, participants and beneficiaries seek-
ing to obtain benefits promised under the plan may go to court after exhausting inter-
nal plan procedures. See id.
56. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Under section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, the only reme-
dies available are the recovery of benefits already accrued under the plan, declaratory
judgments, and injunctions against the plan. See id. Compensatory, consequential,
and punitive damages are not available under ERISA's civil enforcement scheme.
See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).
57. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WEL-
FARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY Acr OF 1974, 4771 (Comm. Print 1976).
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C. "Complete Preemption": Removal Jurisdiction v. ERISA
Preemption
In general, a defendant may remove a state court action to
federal court only if the action originally could have been filed
in federal court.58 Federal courts have original jurisdiction if
there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties
and the amount in controversy is equal to or greater than
$75,00059 or if there exists a federal question.60 Any civil action
brought under ERISA creates a federal question and therefore
triggers federal subject matter jurisdiction.6 1 This Article will
limit its discussion to the issue of removal as it relates to federal
question removal in the context of ERISA preemption.
Federal question removal requires that the plaintiff's state
court action be "arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States. ' 62 Federal question removal is governed
by the "well-pleaded complaint rule." This judicially created
rule looks to the complaint in determining subject matter juris-
diction.63 Accordingly, federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question appears on the face of a well-pleaded com-
plaint. 64 In general, a federal defense does not appear on the
face of a complaint, and therefore a defense of ERISA preemp-
tion would not be sufficient to remove a case to federal court.65
The general rule may be supplanted by the "complete pre-
emption" doctrine, which is a corollary to the well-pleaded
complaint rule.66 The Supreme Court created this exception to
the well-pleaded complaint rule to allow federal jurisdiction in
circumstances in which Congress has "so completely pre-
empt[ed] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this
select group of claims is necessarily federal in character. '67
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1998).
59. See id. § 1332(a).
60. See id. § 1331.
61. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1997).
62. 28 U.S.C.§ 1331.
63. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908).
64. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
65. See id. at 398 (holding that the fact that a defendant might ultimately prove
that a plaintiff's claims are preempted under a federal statute does not establish that
they are removable to federal court).
66. See id. at 393.
67. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987). Congress has
completely preempted the field with respect to claims brought under ERISA plans.
See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998); Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66; see also Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1987)(holding that Congressional intent is clear
"that all suits brought by beneficiaries . . .asserting improper processing of claims
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Under the complete preemption doctrine, a federal statute pos-
sessing extraordinary preemptive power "converts an ordinary
state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule."68
If a federal cause of action completely preempts a state law
cause of action, any state law claim that comes within the scope
of the federal cause of action is considered federal in nature and
the state-based action is consequently preempted. 69 In the con-
text of the remedies section of ERISA, section 502(a)(1)(B), the
Supreme Court has held that the complete preemption doctrine
supports the removal to federal court of any state law causes of
action that fit within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement
provision.70 The consequences of ERISA's preemption provi-
sions and removal are significant.
Indeed, if section 514(a) of ERISA is taken literally and af-
forded its full breadth by the courts, the result is that a plaintiff
may not use state common law or statutory causes of action to
bring a claim against an ERISA-governed plan.' Similarly, if a
plaintiff covered by an ERISA plan wishes to recover for the
denial of benefits under that plan, the use of state law in this
effort against the plan is prohibited because ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) is the exclusive means by which such a suit may be
brought against the plan.72 Failure to comprehend ERISA's
preemption provisions may negatively affect a plan participant's
or beneficiary's ability to seek redress for wrongs carried out
under an ERISA plan.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND ERISA PREEMPTION
To determine whether a state law claim is preempted under
ERISA, courts must first determine whether the plan at issue is
under ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal questions governed by [ERISA's
civil enforcement mechanisms]").
68. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (citing Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65).
69. See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65-66.
70. See id. at 66.
71. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48 (1987).
72. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298,
301-02 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the decision of the defendant MCO to cancel a
heart surgery previously authorized was not medical malpractice, but rather the de-
nial was that of a benefit due under the plan and therefore the state law claims were
completely preempted by § 502(a)(1)(B)); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F.
Supp. 966, 972-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868
F. Supp. 110, 113 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that in order for the plaintiff to prove mal-
practice, the court would be required to examine the underlying benefits of the plan,
thereby preempting the state law claim).
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an ERISA plan.7 3 Next, courts must decide if the state law "re-
lates to" an employee benefit plan. Defining this phrase is diffi-
cult. As one commentator has stated, "identifying the
outermost limits of ERISA preemption under this clause has
been problematic. 74
For example, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , the Supreme
Court expanded on a previous decision 76 by stating that a law
"relates to" an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a "connection with or reference to such a
plan. '77 In Shaw, employers petitioned the court for a declara-
tory judgment that ERISA preempted two New York statutes
that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex and required
employers to provide sick leave benefits to their employees for
pregnancy or other nonoccupational disabilities. The Court held
in favor of the employers and held that the state law was pre-
empted. The Court noted, however, that a state law cause of
action is preempted only if the relationship between it and the
ERISA plan is not "too tenuous, remote or peripheral. ' 78
The "connection with or reference to such plan" test has been
used by the Court frequently as the touchstone in addressing the
question of whether a claim is preempted under ERISA section
73. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1987), in which the
U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between mere employee benefits and an actual
employee benefit plan. The Court held that a one-time severance payment made in
accordance with a Maine law requiring a "one-time, lump-sum" severance payment in
the event of a plant closing was not an employee benefit plan as defined by ERISA
and was not therefore preempted. See id. at 2, 9-12.
74. Minc, supra note 7, at 97.
75. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
76. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
77. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S.85, 96-97; see also District of Columbia v.
Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992) (holding that a state law plan "re-
lates to" a covered benefit plan for section 514(a) purposes even if the law is not
specifically designated to do so). Lower courts have set out four categories of laws as
a guide to whether a state law has a "connection with or reference to" and therefore
"relates to" an employee benefit plan. See, e.g., id.; National Elevator Indus., Inc. v.
Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558-1559 (10th Cir.) (1992) ,reciting the four categories as
follows:
First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of the ERISA plans.
Second, laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting require-
ments for ERISA plans. Third, laws that provide rules for the calculation of
the amount of benefits to be paid under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and
common-law rules that provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the
administration of the ERISA plan.
78. Shaw, 463 U.S. 85 at 100, n.21 (1983); see also Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 838-40 (1988) (discussing ERISA preemption of
state law claims in dicta).
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514. While the courts generally start their analysis with a pre-
sumption against preemption, 79 the Supreme Court in Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts80 upheld a Massachusetts law
requiring insurance companies to provide specified mental
health benefits as part of any health insurance plan offered in
the state. The Court held that states may mandate that insured
health benefit plans provide certain benefits under the plan.
The Court determined that although the state statute came
within the scope of ERISA's preemption provision, it was
"saved" from preemption under the "savings clause" of section
514(b)(2)(A). sl
The Court's analysis was based on the "connection with or
reference to" test used in Shaw. In its discussion, the Court
noted that although the state law did not directly regulate em-
ployee benefit plans, it indirectly required employee benefit
plans to purchase state-mandated mental health benefits when
purchasing insurance on behalf of their employees.82 To many
employers, this case stands for the principle that states cannot
mandate benefits on self-insured ERISA plans, but are allowed
to regulate the standards found in fully insured products. To
others, it signifies another example of the poverty of the phrase
"connection with or reference to."
The Court further developed its interpretation of the "con-
nection with or reference to" test in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux. 83 In Pilot Life, the Court held that ERISA pre-
empted state common law causes of action. The law in question
was the Mississippi tort of "bad faith," which arose in connec-
tion with the plaintiff's claim of an alleged improper processing
or denial of a claim for benefits by Pilot Life Insurance Co.
under a plan it insured. The Court reasoned that a common-
sense understanding of the phrase "regulates insurance ' 84 did
79. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740-41 (1985)
(stating, "The presumption is against pre-emption, and we are not inclined to read
limitations into federal statutes in order to enlarge their pre-emptive scope.").
80. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
81. See id. at 739-44.
82. See id. at 739 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981)).
83. 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987).
84. See id. The Court, borrowing from the McCarran-Ferguson Act, defined the
"business of insurance" by noting the following three criteria: First, the law must have
the effect of spreading or transferring a policyholder's risk of loss; second, the law
must constitute "an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured"; and third, the law must be limited in application to the insurance indus-
try. Id. at 48-49 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129
(1982)).
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not support the argument that the state statute in question fell
under the "savings clause."
The Court stated that ERISA's preemption was not limited
merely to those "state laws specifically designed to affect em-
ployee benefit plans. '85 The Court said that a common-sense
view of the word "regulates" would lead to the conclusion that
"in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an im-
pact on the insurance industry but must be specifically directed
toward that industry. ' 86 Instead, the Court held that the com-
mon law claims asserted against the insurer were claims based
upon the improper processing of plan benefits and that state
common law actions could not be "saved." In addition, the
Court held that the law "undoubtedly [met] the criteria for pre-
emption under Section 514(a). 87 After a thorough analysis of
each prong of ERISA's preemption provisions, the Court held
that state common law claims for denial of benefits and common
law remedies such as punitive and consequential damages were
preempted.
In addition, the Court's opinion pointed out that because the
plaintiff's tort action stemmed from the insurance company's
improper processing of the claim, the cause of action was well
within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision under
section 502(a)(1)(B). 88 The Court decided that the extracon-
tractual damages the plaintiff was seeking under the Mississippi
state law were not permitted under section 502(a)(1)(B) and,
therefore, the plaintiff was unable to recover consequential or
punitive damages. 89 The Court concluded that ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions were intended to be exclusive. The
Court stated that this result was confirmed by the legislative his-
tory of those provisions, particularly the history demonstrating
that the preemptive force of ERISA's enforcement provisions
was modeled after the powerful preemptive force of section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.90
Therefore, preemption attaches with respect to remedies for
benefit denials in state law claims by plaintiffs challenging the
procedures used in denying and reviewing benefit claims and
85. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 97-98 (1983)).
86. Id. at 50.
87. Id. at 48.
88. See id. at 52.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 51-56.
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state laws providing that a participant or beneficiary may sue for
consequential or punitive damages for abuse in processing of
these claims. For example, suppose a plan participant or benefi-
ciary became ill and could not work, and consequently exper-
ienced lost wages. If the plan wrongfully refused to precertify a
medical procedure that would have reduced the employee's suf-
fering and allowed the employee to return to work earlier,
under ERISA, all the employee could recover would be to have
the procedure performed.
More recently, the Supreme Court in New York State Confer-
ence of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.91
held that ERISA did not preempt a New York statute that im-
posed a number of surcharges on different classes of payers. By
most accounts, this case appears to have marked the end of the
era of the ever-expanding doctrine of ERISA preemption. In a
unanimous opinion, Justice David Souter wrote that the state
surcharge provisions were not preempted by section 514(a) be-
cause such provisions did not "relate to" employee benefit
plans, in that:
(1) [T]he surcharge provisions neither made reference to
ERISA plans in any manner nor bore the requisite connection
with ERISA plans to trigger pre-emption; (2) any other con-
clusion would bar any state regulation of hospital costs; (3) an
interpretation that Section 514(a) preempted the surcharge
provisions would render nugatory a statute enacted after ER-
ISA by the same Congress; and (4) the history of Medicare
regulation confirmed that Congress never envisioned ERISA
preemption as blocking state health care cost control.92
The Court held that New York's surcharges had merely an
indirect economic effect on ERISA plans. Thus, the Court ap-
pears to have reduced the reach of ERISA section 514(a). As
such, only those state laws that either directly or indirectly re-
quire plan administrators to adopt a minimum level of benefits,
that have an effect on the administration of a plan, or that pre-
91. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). The Travelers case resolved a conflict between the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits regarding whether ERISA preempts state health hospital
surcharges. In United Wire, Metal and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. Morris-
town Mem'l Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993), a divided Third Circuit panel held
that ERISA did not preempt a New Jersey law imposing surcharges on hospital bills
in order to fund an uncompensated care pool. The Second Circuit, however, in Trav-
elers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F. 3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1993), found that a similar
New York surcharge law did preempt the state law because of its purposeful interfer-
ence "with the choices that ERISA plans make for health care coverage."
92. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 645.
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clude the uniform administration and coverage of interstate em-
ployee benefit plans are preempted.93 The limitation of ERISA
preemption in Travelers is significant because it indicates that
the Court has dramatically changed course. Travelers strongly
suggests that the Court has moved away from reading the statu-
tory text of ERISA for its most literal application and toward a
more pragmatic interpretation that may make any further at-
tempts to invoke the preemption of state laws "turn on Con-
gress' intent. 94
The Court has, in fact, stated that "[i]f 'relate to' were taken
to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all
practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course
.. . .-9 The Court, in an effort to provide future guidance,
outlined three categories of state laws that Congress intended to
preempt: (1) state laws that "mandate employee benefit struc-
tures or their administration"; (2) state laws that "provide alter-
native enforcement mechanisms"; and (3) state laws that "bind
plan administrators to a particular choice" and thus function as
a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.96 Shortly thereafter, the
Court reaffirmed this new, less expansive Travelers view of ER-
ISA preemption in De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and
Clinical Services Fund.97
V. ERISA AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
One commentator has suggested that "an increasing number
of medical malpractice claims are likely to be brought against
managed care organizations, either instead of or in addition to
claims against individual providers. '98 The reason for this, it is
suggested, is because "managed care organizations combine
93. See id. at 659.
94. Id. at 655.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 646.
97. In De Buono, 117 S.Ct. 1747 (1997), the Supreme Court held that New York
State is not precluded from imposing a gross receipts tax on ERISA self-funded medi-
cal centers. See id. at 1752. In addition, in California Div. of Labor Standards En-
forcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997), the Supreme Court
considered whether ERISA preempted California's prevailing wage law to the extent
that the law prohibits payment of an apprentice wage to an apprentice trained in an
unapproved program. See id. at 835. The Court held that California's prevailing wage
rate law does not "relate to" employee benefit plans, and therefore, is not preempted
by ERISA. See id. at 842.
98. Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86 AM. J. PuB.
HEALTH 863, 864 (1996).
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medical and financial functions in ways that make it difficult to
separate vicarious from direct responsibility for patient care."99
The courts have generally agreed that malpractice actions
against physicians or other health care professionals who are
either employed or retained by an MCO alleging negligent med-
ical treatment are not preempted by ERISA section 514(a). 1° °
The one area of ERISA litigation that has caused confusion,
however, concerns the issue of medical malpractice either as a
direct action against an MCO or under a theory of vicarious
liability.
A. Direct Malpractice Against an MCO
With some success, MCOs have argued that ERISA preempts
liability for malpractice in situations in which a patient's health
care is paid for through an employer-provided health care plan
covered by ERISA.10 1 While more recent trends indicate move-
ment away from this view, the issues in these cases remain.
These cases have often turned on whether such claims are pre-
empted under either the language of ERISA that preempts all
state laws that "relate to" a plan or the doctrine of "complete
preemption." For example, in Corcoran v. United HealthCare,
Inc.,a0z the district court held that ERISA preempted state mal-
practice and wrongful death actions against an HMO, in a situa-
tion in which a death was related to the HMO's refusal to certify
the plaintiff's physician's hospitalization order during her high-
risk pregnancy. In that case, United Healthcare authorized lim-
ited home nursing care in lieu of hospitalization. The plaintiff's
fetus went into distress and died during a period of time when
the nurse was not on duty.10 3 The district court held that be-
cause the plaintiffs were "attempting to recover for a tort alleg-
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457 (4th Cir. 1996); Pacifi-
care of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Lancaster v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997);
Edelen v. Osterman, 943 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D. D.C. 1996).
101. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298
(8th Cir. 1993); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Conn.
1990) ("ERISA... preempts [state common law actions] ... since they all 'have one
central feature: the circumstances of [the participant's] medical treatment under his
employer's [health] services plan for employees."') (quoting Rollo v. Maxicare of La.,
Inc. 695 F. Supp. 245, 248 (E.D. La. 1988)); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs.,
868 F. Supp. 110, 114 (D. Md. 1994); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp.
966, 972 (S.D.N.Y 1994); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317 (D. N.J. 1993).
102. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
103. See id. at 1322-23.
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edly committed in the course of handling a benefit
determination," their negligence claims were based upon a ben-
efits determination.1" Thus, the district court held that the
claim "related to" the ERISA plan and consequently was pre-
empted under the federal law.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision. The Fifth Circuit was, nevertheless, con-
cerned by the implications of its own conclusion:
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the
Corcorans have no remedy .... This is troubling for several
reasons. First, it eliminates an important check on the
thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the bur-
geoning utilization review system .... [I]f the cost of compli-
ance with a standard of care (reflected either in the cost of
prevention or the cost of paying judgments) need not be fac-
tored into utilization review companies' cost of doing business,
bad medical judgments will end up being cost-free to the plans
that rely on these companies to contain medical costs. ERISA
plans, in turn, will have one less incentive to seek out the com-
panies that can deliver both high quality service and reason-
able prices .... Fundamental changes such as the widespread
institution of utilization review would seem to warrant a re-
evaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to serve its noble
purpose of safeguarding the interests of employees. Our sys-
tem, of course, allocates this task to Congress, not the courts,
and we acknowledge our role today by interpreting ERISA in
a manner consistent with the expressed intentions of its cre-
ators (footnote omitted). 105
Although the Fifth Circuit clearly was troubled with its own
result, in all likelihood the holding in Corcoran would not have
been any different had it been decided following the Travelers
case,10 6 because of the Supreme Court's unchanging position
that ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) remains the exclusive means
of recovery for the denial of a claim for benefits.
B. Malpractice Actions Against an MCO for Vicarious
Liability
The imposition of liability on one person for the actionable
conduct of another, based solely on a relationship between the
104. Id. at 1332.
105. Id. at 1338-39.
106. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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two persons, is known as "vicarious liability."'1 7 As mentioned
above, the issue of vicarious liability as it relates to ERISA and
MCOs has been the source of considerable confusion in the
courts. For example, in Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical
Services, °8 the district court held that a malpractice action
against an MCO based on vicarious liability was preempted
under ERISA section 514(a). The court held that in order to
decide a vicarious liability action, a court must refer to the em-
ployee benefit plan in order to establish whether the plan cre-
ates an agency relationship between the MCO and the
physician. A vicarious liability malpractice claim also requires
the deciding court to judge the quality of the benefits promised
against the quality of the benefits received. 0 9 The Pomeroy
court determined that such a "reference to" the employee bene-
fit plan required that the action be preempted, in conformity
with the Supreme Court's holding in Shaw.1'0
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held in Rice v. Panchall" that
a malpractice action against an HMO based on vicarious liability
was not completely preempted under ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B)." 2 The court held that although the employee
benefit plan administered by the MCO would "serve as evidence
of [a physician's] apparent agency, the alleged agency does not
necessarily rise and fall with the Plan. Rather, this is a case in
which '[b]eyond the simple need to refer to the ... [Plan], the
... [Plan] is irrelevant to the dispute . ... "I Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit in Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage"4 held
107. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
108. 868 F. Supp. 110, 116 (D. Md. 1994).
109. See id. at 114 (holding that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's claims).
110. See id. at 113.
111. 65 F.3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995).
112. See id; see also Kohn v. Delaware Valley HMO, Inc., 14 Emp. Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 2336 (Dec. 20, 1991), in which the court held that a personal injury claim does
"not relate to the benefit plan," and plaintiffs who alleged personal injury arising
under an ERISA plan were allowed to sue without exhausting administrative reme-
dies. The District Court in Kohn refused, on a motion for reconsideration, to dismiss
the "ostensible agency" count for the negligence of the health care providers but held
that the claim for punitive damages was preempted by ERISA. See id. at 2340. The
court explained that the "malpractice claim did not arise out of the ERISA plan's
contract," that is, it did not "relate to" the benefit plan. Id.; see also Independence
HMO, Inc. v Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
113. Rice, 65 F.3d at 645 (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994)).
114. 591 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
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that a malpractice claim based on vicarious liability against an
MCO was not preempted by ERISA section 514(a).115
While the courts continue to split on whether ERISA
preempts medical malpractice claims based on vicarious liabil-
ity, a number of more recent appellate court opinions may pro-
vide new hope to patients and beneficiaries concerned about
this important question. For example, in Dukes v. U.S. Health-
care Inc.,16 the Third Circuit held that ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) does not completely preempt an employee health
benefit plan participant's state common law malpractice action
against an HMO based on the theory of vicarious liability. 117
The Dukes court held that removal to federal court of the plain-
tiff's claims of inadequate and negligent care by physicians affili-
ated with an employer-provided HMO was improper under the
"well-pleaded complaint" rule.
The Third Circuit determined that the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Metropolitan Life" 8 effectively narrowed the application
of ERISA preemption when it stated that "Congress intended
the complete-preemption doctrine to apply to state law causes
of action which fit within the scope of ERISA's civil-enforce-
ment provisions."1" 9 Noting that the plaintiffs were not address-
115. Id. The Tenth Circuit in Pacificare focused its analysis on the meaning of
ERISA § 514(a) and its "relates to" language. The court held that the following four
types of state laws "relate to" an employee benefit plan and are therefore preempted
by ERISA § 514(a): " First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA
plans. Second, laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting requirements
for ERISA plans. Third, laws that provide rules for the calculation ofthe amount of
benefits to be paid under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law rules that
provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA
plan." Id. at 154 (quoting National Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555,
1558-59 (10th Cir. 1992)).
116. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995). In Dukes, the widow of an ERISA plan partici-
pant and HMO user filed a malpractice suit against a number of defendants including
the HMO. See id. at 353-56. Mr. Dukes received his medical care through an HMO
that provided and supervised the physicians that delivered medical treatment to the
plan participants. See id. Mrs. Dukes alleged that the HMO was responsible, under
Pennsylvania's state ostensible agency law, for the negligence of its health personnel.
See id. She also alleged direct negligence in the HMO's failure to meet its duty of
reasonable care in the selection, retention, screening, monitoring, and evaluation of
the medical personnel who actually provided the medical services to her husband. See
id.
117. See id. at 357. Dukes consolidated two cases on appeal, Dukes v. U.S. Health
Care Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994), and Visconti ex rel. Visconti v. U.S.
Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
118. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
119. Dukes, 57 F. 3d at 354 (citing Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66). "State law
claims which fall outside of the scope of § 502, even if preempted by § 514(a), are still
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ing the denial of benefits but rather the "quality" of the benefits
under the employee benefit plan, the court stated that "[a]s a
result, the plaintiffs' claims fall outside of the scope of
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and these cases must be remanded to the state
courts from which they were removed.' 120 In addition, in an ef-
fort to address the issue of section 514(a) preemption, the Third
Circuit cited the Supreme Court's holding in Travelers and fol-
lowed the Court's characterization of the lawsuit as an action to
recover for the inadequate quality of care provided by the
HMO. The Third Circuit stated in Dukes that "[q]uality control
of benefits, such as ... health care benefits ... is a field tradi-
tionally occupied by state regulation and we interpret the silence
of Congress as reflecting an intent that it remain such.' 121
C. Suits Against an MCO Based on Plan Design
In Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic
States, Inc.112 a federal district court examined a number of the
plaintiff's claims, including direct liability negligence, fraud, and
misrepresentation, against an MCO that administered an em-
ployee benefit plan. The defendant, Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, had designed an incentive program for purposes of con-
trolling expenditures and provided bonuses to physicians who
refrained from ordering unnecessary and costly medical tests
and procedures. 2 3 The plaintiffs sued Kaiser on behalf of their
minor daughter, arguing that the structure and design of the in-
centive program encouraged physicians to make treatment deci-
sions for financial rather than medical reasons. 24
governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and, therefore, are not removable under
the complete-preemption principles established in Metropolitan Life." Id. at 355.
120. Id. at 356.
121. Id. at 357. The Dukes court also distinguished the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), stating that Corco-
ran focused on the common law liability of a company performing utilization manage-
ment activities and the denial of a benefit allegedly due under the terms of an
ERISA-covered employee benefit plan. In contrast, the issue in Dukes concerned the
HMO's vicarious liability for the rendering of poor quality medical services to plan
participants. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 360-61. See also Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hospi-
tal, EDPA No. 96-9858 (1998).
122. 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997). Lancaster is currently on appeal on the
issue of whether a state claim for the failure of an HMO, in its capacity as a medical
service provider, to disclose physician financial incentives to limit referrals is pre-
empted by ERISA. See also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997) (holding that ERISA preempts state law claims against
an MCO).
123. See Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1140-41.
124. See id.
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The Lancaster plaintiffs sued Kaiser Foundation Health Plans,
from whom they sought treatment and who was also the admin-
istrator of the Lancasters' employee benefit plan.1 5 The Lan-
casters sought treatment from Kaiser for their daughter's
recurrent and severe vomiting and headaches. For a period of
approximately four years, the Kaiser physicians treated the mi-
nor with adult-strength narcotics to control her condition.1 2 6
During that time, the Kaiser physicians did not order an MRI,
CAT scan, EEG, or any other diagnostic test to assess the child's
headaches.127 Finally, tests were ordered and revealed that the
girl suffered from a frontal lobe brain tumor and cystic mass that
had metastasized to over forty percent of her brain. 28 Unfortu-
nately, a series of brain surgeries to remove the girl's tumor
were not entirely successful. 129
The court held that the direct liability claims against Kaiser
were preempted by ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 130 The court
stated that the plaintiffs' negligence claims attacked the MCO's
administrative decisions that "had the effect of denying benefits
to Lancaster as a plan participant because it inappropriately in-
fluenced [the physicians] to take certain non-medical factors,
most notably, their incomes, into account when prescribing
treatment.' 13 1 The court determined that
the aim and effect of both [the utilization review and the finan-
cial incentive programs] are essentially the same: both policies
seek to constrain health care costs by denying supposedly un-
necessary medical treatment and, thus, both may affect the
quantity, as well as the quality, of benefits provided to a pa-
tient under a[n] [ERISA] plan.' 32
The court also held that the characterization of the claims as
challenges to Kaiser's administrative structure that caused a de-
nial of benefits did indeed invoke complete preemption under
ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B). As such, the state common law
direct liability claims against the MCO were dismissed, as were
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1150. The court ruled that the claims of individual and vicarious
liability malpractice were not preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) or § 514(a). See
id. at 1149-50.
131. Id. at 1147.
132. Id. at 1148.
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the claims regarding the establishment of the financial incentive
program.
In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit held in Shea v. Esensten133
that a plaintiff's state common law claims of fraudulent nondis-
closure and misrepresentation against an MCO that flowed from
the MCO's financial incentive program were completely pre-
empted. In Shea, the plaintiff alleged that her husband had not
received proper treatment and diagnosis for a heart condition
due to the MCO's financial incentive program that rewarded
physicians for refraining from making referrals to specialists.134
The court held that the plaintiff's claims were preempted be-
cause the result of allowing the common law suit would be to
"clearly affect how ERISA-regulated benefit plan[s] [are] ad-
ministered, and if similar cases are brought in state courts across
the country, ERISA plan administrators will inevitably be
forced to tailor their plan disclosures to meet each state's unique
requirements.' 1 35 The Eighth Circuit further reasoned that such
a holding would contradict the principle established in Travelers
that the primary intent of Congress in enacting ERISA's pre-
emption provisions was to ensure "the nationally uniform ad-
ministration of employee benefit plans."1 36
The plaintiff in Shea amended her complaint against the MCO
following the removal of the case to federal court. The
amended complaint alleged that the MCO, in failing to disclose
the financial incentive program, had breached its fiduciary duty
to disclose all material facts affecting a plan participant's or ben-
eficiary's interest. The court held that the MCO had breached
its fiduciary duties in not disclosing its financial incentive pro-
gram to plan participants. 137 The court determined that the
MCO "was offering financial incentives that could have colored
his doctor's medical judgment.... Health care decisions involve
matters of life and death, and an ERISA fiduciary has a duty to
speak out if it 'knows that silence might be harmful.' "138 Both
Lancaster and Shea appear to be consistent with the text of ER-
133. 107 F. 3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997).
134. Id. at 627.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995)).
137. See id.; see also ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1998) (requiring plan fiduci-
aries to "discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries").
138. Shea, 107 F.3d. at 629 (quoting Bixler v. Central Penn. Teamsters Health &
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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ISA's preemption provision and the holding in the Travelers
case. Although the courts have sent mixed signals regarding
when and if a state law claim may be preempted by ERISA,
state legislatures and Congress have begun considering this issue
in terms of reform.
VI. THE ROAD TO REFORM
In retrospect, it is ironic that the Congressional intent behind
ERISA's preemption provisions was to "round out the protec-
tion afforded participants. ' 139 While the courts have attempted
to sort out the circumstances under which participants and bene-
ficiaries of ERISA plans may sue an MCO for malpractice, this
drama has played out against the backdrop of public concern
regarding the quality of the health care system in general. "In
1993-1994, President Clinton favored a heavy hand from govern-
ment to guarantee health coverage to every American. That at-
tempt failed miserably with the public and played a large part in
the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. '' 140 Prior to this
more expansive debate, Congress considered a number of bills
that would have amended ERISA's liability provisions. At that
time, employers and insurers created a powerful coalition to de-
feat the legislation that became known as the Pilot Life bill,
named after the Supreme Court case it sought, in part, to over-
turn.141 Ultimately, this smaller debate was swept away by the
proposals for more comprehensive reform which later, in effect,
defaulted to the private market.
Pursuant to the growth of managed care, serious questions
concerning the quality of the services received through such
plans have been raised.142 In part, these questions have been
driven by the rapid changes in the health care system, which
have occurred quickly and without the opportunity for active co-
139. Representative John Dent (D-Pa.), one of the original authors of ERISA,
stated: "Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of
this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the
field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the
protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsis-
tent State and local regulation." 120 CONG. REC. 29, 197 (1974).
140. Marilyn Werber Serafini, Micromanaged Care?, 28 NAT'L J., 2506, 2506
(1997).
141. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
142. See JOHN E. WARE JR. ET AL., DIFFERENCES IN 4-YEAR HEALTH OUTCOMES
FOR ELDERLY AND POOR, CHRONICALLY ILL PATIENTS TREATED IN HMO AND FEE-
FOR-SERVICE SYSTEMS (1996) (finding that elderly and poor, chronically ill patients
have worse physical health outcomes in HMOs than in fee-for-service systems).
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operation and partnership with the public. It is true that a
number of recent decisions, such as Dukes, Rice, and Pacificare,
suggest that the courts are slowly attempting to provide patients
with more meaningful ways to find redress for harms caused by
MCOs delivering employee benefit health care services. Never-
theless, a public policy void still exists. This void, coupled with
the current managed care backlash,143 has increased the pressure
for an incremental political solution to address the issue of ER-
ISA damages. As a result, patient, consumer, and physician ad-
vocacy groups have responded by taking their cases to their
elected officials in both the states and the Congress.
A. The States
Texas recently became the first state to allow an individual to
sue a health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization,
or other managed care entity for damages proximately caused
by the entities failure to exercise ordinary care when making a
health care treatment decision.1 " Under the Texas Health Care
Liability Act, these entities may be held liable for substandard
health care treatment decision made by their employees agents,
or representatives. 4 5 The Act also establishes an independent
review process for adverse benefit determinations and requires
an insured or enrollee to submit his or her claim challenging an
adverse benefit determination to a review by an independent re-
view organization if such a review is requested by the managed
care entity.1 46 Additional responsibilities for HMOs and further
requirements concerning review of an adverse benefit determi-
nation by an independent review organization are also ad-
dressed by the Act. 147
While many believed the law would succumb to ERISA's pre-
emption provisions, Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas, recently upheld
the Texas law that allows individuals the right to sue an MCO
143. A survey conducted by the Kaiser/Harvard Program on the Public and
Health/Social Policy found that a majority of Americans (52%) say the government
should protect consumers of managed care. See Kaiser/Harvard Nat'l Survey of
Americans' Views on Managed Care (1997).
144. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 88.002(a) (1998); see also PATRICIA A.
BUTLER, MANAGED CARE PLAN LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF TEXAS AND MISSOURI
LEGISLATION PREPARED FOR THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (1997).
145. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 88.002(b).
146. Id. at § 88.003(c).
147. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 20A.09, 20A.12, 20A.12A, 2158A, and 21.58C
(West 1998).
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over medical decisions affecting patient quality of care.148
Aetna Health Plans had sued to block the law, arguing that it
was preempted by ERISA because it improperly interfered with
the administration of employee benefit plans.149 Although the
Judge did strike down the portion of the Act that created an
independent review process to evaluate adverse benefit determi-
nations as preempted, more recently she agreed to stay her Sep-
tember ruling on this issue until a higher court ruled on an
appeal. 150
The stay was sought by Texas Attorney General Dan Morales
who appealed that part of Gilmore's ruling concerning the re-
view process to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Judge Gilmore's rulings strongly suggest that there is an increas-
ing willingness on the part of the Courts to recognize the distinc-
tion between the quality and the quantity of benefits due under
an employee benefit plan. While this distinction may prove to
be somewhat tenuous, especially in the area of mental health
benefits, the emerging line of cases utilizing this reasoning ap-
pears to be growing.
The Texas statute also contains a provision, similar to the re-
cently enacted statute in Missouri, which eliminates the "corpo-
rate practice of medicine" defense in certain non-ERISA
liability claims.15' Under the "corporate practice of medicine"
doctrine, unlicensced individuals and companies are prohibited
from engaging in the practice of medicine.152 Therefore, by as-
serting the "corporate practice of medicine" defense in cases of
alleged liability, MCOs may successfully avoid liability because
they are, by definition, not legally capable of practicing
medicine as an entity.
The "corporate practice of medicine" doctrine was created by
both statute and court opinions, and was developed to ensure
that corporate involvement in medical practice would not create
undue conflicts that would corrupt the clinical judgment of phy-
sicians. The unfortunate consequence of "corporate practice of
148. CORPORATE HEALTH INSURANCE INC. V. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSUR-
ANCE, S.D. TEX., H-97-2072, SEPTEMBER 18, 1998).
149. See CORPORATE HEALTH INS., INC. V. TEXAS DEP'T OF INS., No. H-97-2072
(D. Tex. filed June 16, 1997).
150. HEALTH INSURANCE INC. V. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, S.D.
TEXAS, No. H-97-2-72. (October 8, 1998).
151. See id. § 88.002(h).
152. For a complete description of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine,
see generally Andre Hampton, Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate Prac-
tice of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogma New Tricks, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 490 (1998).
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medicine" prohibitions is that plaintiffs, like those in the ERISA
context, are left without an appropriate remedy for alleged acts
of negligence by non-physicians. In contrast, courts not bound
by this doctrine nor limited by the confines of ERISA have
found that MCOs may be held accountable under the theory of
direct liability for negligence. 153
Although a majority of states have enacted some sort of man-
aged care reforms, the actual reach of these laws continue to be,
in some instances, limited by ERISA's federal preemption pro-
visions. 154 Proposals to expand or clarify the liability of man-
aged care plans have been considered in several other states,
including California and New York. One result of the Texas ex-
perience may be to embolden other states to enact similar re-
forms. At the same time, this develop may also have the effect
of providing Congress with the opportunity to postpone consid-
eration of this important issue for several more years to come.
B. The Congress
On the federal level, Congress has enacted miscellaneous in-
surance and managed care reforms over the years. For example,
Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996, ("HIPPA"), which addresses, among
other things, the portability of insurance. Like a number of
states, Congress has also begun to enact managed care reforms
such as a maternity length of stay measure, as well as mental
health parity legislation.
During the 105th Congress a number of managed care and
ERISA reform proposals were introduced. For example, Rep-
resentative Charles Norwood (R-Ga.) and Senator Alphonse
D'Amato (R-N.Y.) sponsored the Patient Access to Responsi-
153. In Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the California
Court of Appeals suggested in dicta that "[t]hird-party payors of health care services
can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from
defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms" and all
parties responsible for a person's injuries should be made to answer for those injuries.
Id. at 670. The Wickline court held that public sector third-party payors could be
liable for their negligent actions. See id. The same court in Wilson v. Blue Cross of S.
Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), extended liability to private third-
party payors. More recently, in Fox v. Health Net, No. 21962, 1993 WL 794305 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993), a jury awarded $89 million to the estate of a deceased
enrollee who had been denied coverage for experimental treatment.
154. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 964 F. Supp.
1285, 1299 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (finding that the Arkansas "Patient Protection Act,"
which requires that health plans include any qualified health care service provider
who is willing to meet the plan's participation terms, was preempted by ERISA).
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ble Care Act ("PARCA"). 5 5 This bill was a comprehensive
managed care reform bill that would have, among other things,
amended ERISA's preemption provisions and allow plaintiffs to
bring state causes of action "to recover damages for personal
injury or wrongful death. ' 156 The bill was co-sponsored by over
220 members of Congress. Representative Norwood also spon-
sored the Responsibility in Managed Care Act,157 which was a
stand-alone ERISA reform bill substantially similar to his more
comprehensive bill. This more incremental bill sought to ensure
that employers cannot be sued unless the plan sponsor uses its
discretionary authority to review and make decisions on claims
and this error results in personal or financial injury or wrongful
death.
In addition, many others in Congress sponsored ERISA re-
form legislation, including Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), who
introduced the Employee Health Insurance Accountability
Act. 58 Like the Norwood bill, this measure would remove the
force of ERISA's preemption for "any cause of action under
State law to recover damages for medical malpractice, personal
injury or wrongful death." This bill would also attempt to hold
employers harmless unless they "exercis[e] discretionary author-
ity" over a claim. Finally, Representative Pete Stark (D-Cal.)
introduced the "Managed Care Plan Accountability Act.' 59
While this bill would also amend ERISA, it is interesting be-
cause it diverges from the other proposals in that it creates a
federal remedy rather than allowing plaintiffs to bring claims
under state law.
It is worth noting that during the 1996 Presidential campaign,
President Clinton, mindful of the criticisms of his previous re-
form efforts, established the Advisory Commission on Con-
sumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry.
Although the Commission recommended a "Patient Bill of
Rights" which included grievance and appeals procedures, it was
unable to reach a consensus on the important issue of ERISA
damages. The President used the Commission's work to high-
light the need for managed care reforms including the need for
more meaningful remedies. He announced that all federal pro-
grams would follow the "Patient Bill of Rights" and instructed
155. H.R. 1415 105th Cong. (1997); S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997).
156. H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
157. H.R. 2960, 105th Cong. (1997).
158. S. 1136, 105th Cong. (1997).
159. H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997).
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the federal agencies to implement as many of the Commission's
recommendations as possible. For example, the Department of
Labor recently issued two notices of proposed rulemaking that
would provide greater information to beneficiaries of ERISA
plans while also amending the current rules regarding the stan-
dards for the processing employee benefit claims filed by benefi-
ciaries and participants. 160 The President also threatened to
veto any legislation passed by Congress that did not include
strong remedies. While many had predicted that the 105th Con-
gress would enact meaningful managed care reforms, albeit
without ERISA remedies, the Monica Lewinsky scandal
plagued the Clinton White House, thwarting any attempts to
support reform efforts in Congress.
In the end, the House of Representatives passed a Republican
sponsored version of the "Patient Protection Act," (H.R. 4250)
that failed to contain meaningful ERISA liability reforms. In
addition, the United States Senate was unable to agree on
whether to vote on this or any other managed care reform legis-
lation prior to the adjournment of the 105th Congress leaving
any hope for change in the hands of the forthcoming 106th
Congress.
C. The Alternatives
Currently the most popular stance in the debate over re-
forming ERISA's preemption and damages provisions appears
to be that of maintaining the status quo. Assuming, however,
that this will no longer be acceptable in the future given the ac-
tivities of the courts and state legislatures across the country,
there are generally four options for amending ERISA in order
to address remedies.1 6 1 First, a federal cause of action could be
established for plan liability negligence, along with a uniform
and expanded remedy under ERISA. This remedy could be
capped, as has occurred in states enacting medical malpractice
reform laws, or it could allow for the more traditional remedies,
160. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; Rules and Regulations
for Administrative and Enforcement; Claims Procedure, 63 Fed. Reg. 48390 (1998)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2569) (proposed Sept. 9, 1998); Proposed Amend-
ments to Summary Plan Description Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 48376 (1998) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2520) (proposed Sept. 9, 1998).
161. See Remedies, Preliminary Staff Draft prepared for the Subcomm. on Roles
and Responsibilities of Public/Private Purchasers and Quality Oversight Organiza-
tions, President's Advisory Comm'n on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health
Care Industry (Jan. 21, 1998).
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which include compensatory damages, treble damages, civil pen-
alties, punitive damages, mandatory attorneys' fees, and court
costs. 162 The proposal introduced by Representative Stark is
faithful to this approach and is consistent with ERISA's intent
to preserve uniformity for employee benefit plans. Not surpris-
ingly, the trial bar appears to favor increasing remedies under
ERISA while leaving the remedies uncapped.
Second, ERISA's preemption provisions could be amended to
allow state tort and contract remedies to apply.163 A version of
this approach is envisioned in the legislation introduced by Rep-
resentative Norwood and Senators D'Amato and Durbin.
While this approach would be a departure from the original con-
gressional intent of preserving uniformity, it may prove to be the
most politically viable option, given the current emphasis on re-
turning power to the states. Although there appears to be a
countervailing trend in the area of health care legislation, the
fact that Congress is likely to continue to be controlled by Re-
publican majorities assured that the states' rights arguments will
be forcefully made if not followed.
Third, legislation could be enacted that would establish a uni-
form standard to be applied to all insurance arrangements
across the board.164 This approach would create a federal stan-
dard that could be used as a floor, thereby allowing states the
ability to enact additional remedies, or as a ceiling. This ap-
proach was used in the recently enacted HIPPA legislation and
could indicate that Congress is interested in balancing the im-
portant questions surrounding the extent to which the state or
federal governments should regulate the private insurance
market.
Finally, Congress could decide that for benefit claims, state
remedies would be exclusive and that there would be no ERISA
remedies.165 In other words, claims would be required to be
brought in state court rather than allowing such suits to be
brought in either state or federal court. Regardless of which ap-
proach is taken, the subject of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") processes will inevitably arise as well. Mediation and
arbitration are perhaps the best-known examples of ADR.
ADR "refers to a wide range of mechanisms and processes
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 6.
165. See id.
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designed to resolve differences between parties without resort-
ing to litigation. ' 166 The more general subject of tort reform will
inevitably enter the debate as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
The courts have sent mixed signals regarding whether MCOs
can be sued for medical malpractice. Many MCOs have used
ERISA to shield themselves against liability. While some fed-
eral appellate courts have found a way to make remedies avail-
able to patients, the current state of the law is uneven. For
example, a federal district court judge recently decried the sta-
tus quo under ERISA in a strongly worded opinion suggesting
that courts have "no choice but to pluck [claims] out of the state
court.., and then.., slam the courthouse doors in [the plain-
tiffs'] face ... without any remedy.' 1 67 At the same time, many
other health care providers continue to be subject to compensa-
tory, consequential, and punitive damages for claims of negli-
gence. While many have blamed the confusion surrounding
ERISA preemption provisions and its resulting negative effects
on patients on poor drafting, it remains the work of the courts to
interpret the law. The front of the U.S. Supreme Court building
still bears the motto "equal justice under law." If this standard
of fairness is to be applied more generally, it would certainly
appear that the ERISA law should be changed or at least inter-
preted to provide some fairness for patients that is not wholly
dependent on the type of health plan individuals maintain for
themselves or their family.
To date, at least one state legislature has attempted to provide
patients with an adequate, if not generous, remedy for negligent
care provided by an MCO. The backlash against managed care
and the lack of appropriate remedies under ERISA are undeni-
able. It appears that the many changes in the nation's health
care system have made the American public anxious and pre-
pared for reform.168
166. See NAOMI KARP & ERICA WOOD, RESOLUTION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES IN
MANAGED CARE: INSIGHTS FROM AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ROUNDTABLE (American
Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Legal Problems of the Elderly, 1997).
167. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass. 1997).
168. See CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE PUBLIC OPINION
POLL (October 7, 1997). Nearly a quarter of patients reported that it has become
more difficult to get medical care compared with three years ago, while one in ten are
not satisfied with the care that they receive. See id.
1998]
33
Rooney: States, Congress, <i>or</i> the Courts: Who Will Be First to Refo
Published by LAW eCommons, 1998
Annals of Health Law
It is true that individuals continue to maintain the option of
paying for the costs of the treatment themselves when benefits
are denied. From the patient's perspective, however, a claim de-
nied often means that needed access to treatment is out of
reach. ERISA plans arguably have allowed the private sector
the ability to provide access to health benefits to millions where
there otherwise would be none. These plans should be ap-
plauded for their voluntary efforts to provide health benefits to
the masses. Any attempts to reform ERISA should account for
potential adverse effects that increased costs, stemming from the
greater availability of damages, may have on the ability of em-
ployers to provide benefits to their employees.
Nevertheless, Congress should undertake an earnest attempt
at even-handed reform. This effort should clarify the distinction
between ERISA plans and MCOs more clearly. It should also
endeavor to make the distinction between "claims determina-
tions" and "medical care decisions" more evident under the law.
In addition, Congress should honor the original intent of the law
by preserving the goals of uniformity and ease of administration
for plan sponsors. To accomplish this goal, Congress should
take the federal approach to amending ERISA. Should Con-
gress choose to create a federal floor or ceiling, as it did in the
HIPAA legislation, it should be aware that this strategy could be
less successful at providing plan sponsors the necessary uniform-
ity they require to continue to provide benefits to their employ-
ees. Finally, ERISA reform should include more general tort
reforms, such as caps on damages, as a means to preserve em-
ployers' interest in sponsoring plans, while allowing MCOs to
provide medical care.
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